• cadekat@pawb.social
    link
    fedilink
    arrow-up
    4
    ·
    5 days ago

    Yes, that’s a decent option. Browsers offer pretty good keystores these days, and you could keep an encrypted copy on your instance (or use BIP39 seed phrases or whatever!)

    • sbv@sh.itjust.works
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      5
      ·
      5 days ago

      If the browser is running js from the server to maintain and use the keystore, then it’s at risk from malicious admins. They can inject js to reveal the keys.

      Keeping keys on the instance means the instance eventually decrypts them, which puts the user at risk of malicious admins.

      It feels like the only way to make it work is with trusted apps that are independent of the instance admins.

      • cadekat@pawb.social
        link
        fedilink
        arrow-up
        5
        ·
        5 days ago

        That’s, surprisingly, not the case at all! You can make non-exportable keys. The instance owner could, theoretically, change the published key for an account, but that would be visible.

        • sbv@sh.itjust.works
          link
          fedilink
          English
          arrow-up
          1
          ·
          4 days ago

          What prevents the malicious admin from telling the browser to sign arbitrary messages without exporting the keys?

          • cadekat@pawb.social
            link
            fedilink
            arrow-up
            1
            ·
            4 days ago

            They can, for sure. You need a few more bits to make it reasonably secure.

            For this particular problem, a revocation key that isn’t accessible to the instance might be sufficient? That adds complexity and something else the user has to remember…

            • sbv@sh.itjust.works
              link
              fedilink
              English
              arrow-up
              1
              ·
              4 days ago

              How would you make it secure? It seems like the home instance admin would be able to sign arbitrary messages whenever the user connects with a browser.

              • cadekat@pawb.social
                link
                fedilink
                arrow-up
                1
                ·
                4 days ago

                Indeed, yeah. You’d have to publish a message with your revocation key that disclaims the forgeries.

                • sbv@sh.itjust.works
                  link
                  fedilink
                  English
                  arrow-up
                  1
                  ·
                  3 days ago

                  How would users see the forgeries? Presumably the malicious admin would filter them from their feed.

                  • cadekat@pawb.social
                    link
                    fedilink
                    arrow-up
                    1
                    ·
                    3 days ago

                    That’s a good point! I guess you’d need to migrate to another instance, but people still on the malicious instance wouldn’t see your revocations. That’s a visible and attributable fault though… Or have clients pull revocations from all the instances they know about, but that could overload smaller servers… Hm… Great insight!